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Abstract 
The map;ping between arithmetical expressions and meta-arithmetical statements, based on 
Giidel’s numbering, cannot go awry in any “non-standard” model, as Sloman suggested. Gadel’s 
numbering :itself cannot go awry, because it involves only the standard model, and the extra 
elements in “non-standard” models, in so far as they are involved in meta-theoretical interpretation 
at all, cannot affect the mapping, because they have no independent meta-theoretical meaning. @ 
1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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Sloman published his review [5] of Penrose’s “Emperor’s New Mind” [4] in 1992, 
to which we responded in 1995 [ 11. However, we have since experienced much resid- 
ual discomfort about a theoretically important and intriguing detail in Sloman’s ar- 
gument that was not sufficiently addressed in our response. The “detail” in question 
is Sloman’s suggestion that the mapping which provides the Gijdel sentence with the 
meta-arithmetical meaning of asserting its own unprovability might go awry in certain 
models of arithmetic. This radical suggestion is already implicit when Sloman asks 
“why are people so convinced that what [ Giidel’s sentence] says is true?’ and answers 
that “this conviction depends crucially on the mapping that is set up by Giidel’s num- 
bering” (p. 385). Later, discussing the meta-theoretical meaning of Giidel’s sentence 
G(F), where F is the system of formal arithmetic in question, Sloman explicitly sug- 
gests that it will “perhaps turn out, in some of the “non-standard” models that make 
G(F) false, that the assumed mapping between complex arithmetical expressions and 
meta-linguistic statements about F goes awry” (p. 386). This suggestion is apparently 
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presented in support of the claim that G(F) “is merely an assertion about numbers”, 
which it follows (p. 386). The connection between the suggestion and this claim was 
already covered in [ 1, p. 3911, to which we add the remark that G(F) may not even be 
“merely” about numbers: there are also non-numerical models of arithmetic consisting 
e.g. of closed terms [ 3, p. 2061. But the suggestion about the mapping is also interesting 
in itself and invites some further analysis, especially since Sloman does not specify how 
the mapping could go awry or in what sense, nor why does he mention this possibility 
only for some of the models that make G(F) false. The suggestion could also mean 
that meta-theoretical interpretation of G(F) can produce varying interpretations, which 
corresponds to Sloman’s claim that “G(F) does not express some definite . . . propo- 
sition about formulas in F” (p. 386). Since G(F) is commonly thought to assert its 
own unprovability in F, this claim would mean either that G(F) may fail to refer to 
itself or that it may assert something else about itself. But the self-reference of G(F) 
is provable even within F itself: the equation between the term which G(F) uses to 
refer to itself and the numeral of its Giidel number is provable in F [ 2, p. 1731, so that 
in all models of F these terms refer to the same thing. The possibility that G(F) may 
attribute to itself something other than unprovability in F was already mentioned in [ 1, 
pp. 390-3911, allowing the extended sense of unprovability even outside of F. 
However, even regardless of which meta-arithmetical meaning(s), if any, a mapping 
gone awry might assign to G(F) in certain models, there is a general argument against 
the possibility of the mapping going awry anywhere. The mapping between “complex 
arithmetical expressions and meta-linguistic statements about F” is set up by Godel’s 
numbering of symbols, formulas and proofs of F. The mapping could go awry in some 
“non-standard” model if Godel’s numbering itself went awry, but it cannot do so: the 
numbering involves only (elements of) the standard model of F, namely the natural 
numbers, so it cannot be affected by any other model. The only other way in which 
the mapping could go awry is through the elements that are present in “non-standard” 
models in addition to the natural numbers. But such elements cannot influence the 
mapping, because they do not have any meta-theoretical meaning by themselves. They 
do not number any element of F, because every symbol, formula and proof of F has a 
natural Gijdel number. And even if these elements could influence the mapping in some 
way, they could not affect it at the level of ground expressions: the extra elements are 
not named by any ground terms of F, so they cannot enter into the meta-arithmetical 
interpretation of ground expressions. The same goes for quantified expressions if the 
quantifications are bound (by ground terms of F) Only if quantification is not bound 
can some extra elements satisfy a quantified expression and thus, if the expression has a 
meta-theoretical meaning, can themselves be interpreted in a meta-theoretical way. Thus, 
the relation of semantic influence goes the other way around: it is the mapping between 
expressions of F and statements about F that can give the extra elements a certain meta- 
theoretical interpretation. In short, far from going awry in any “non-standard” model, 
the mapping merely goes a step further in all of them. 
In the case of G(F), which Sloman considers, its extended me&theoretical inter- 
pretation comes about as follows: all models of F in which G(F) is false are models 
of {E lG( F)}, the system obtained by adding -G(F) as an additional axiom to F. 
Every ground instance of -G(F), saying that a particular natural number codes a proof 
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of G(F) in F, is disprovable in F [ 1, p. 3901, but lG( F) itself is an existential 
quantificat.ion which, as a new axiom, demands and establishes the existence of further, 
non-finite elements in all models in question. Since lG( F) states the existence of a 
proof of G(F), the elements satisfying it can be interpreted to code some non-finite 
proofs of G(F) outside of F, e.g. by omega-rules [ 6, p. 17 11. This is not to say that 
the statement that there is a proof of G(F) in F is satisfied by a proof of G(F) outside 
of F, beca.use TG( F) cannot be interpreted in that narrow sense, since its quantification 
is not constrained to range over the natural numbers. The same applies to the universal 
quantification in G(F), so that it still says that it has no proof in F and extends that 
denial to proofs outside of F, which is why it is false. 
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